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Thereawakening of interest in links between price flexibility and
fluctuations in economic activity calls for a reconsideration of models of
price and quantity adjustment. We examine relationships between credit
disturbances and real activity under flexible prices, using monthly data on
real and financial variables over the period from 1879—1914.
Recent theoretical and empirical work has focused on models and
institutions of the post World War II period. Historical episodes of
pronounced business cycles, however, challenge our present formulations of the
causes of fluctuations in output and employment. In this paper we pursue two
goals: (1) to demonstrate that substantial price flexibility existed during
the period to point Out that models of economic fluctuations relying on sticky
prices are not appropriate for analyzing the period, and (ii) to consider the
effects of deflationary shocks on real variables in such a world. Our
principal findings are two. First, we present evidence from several empirical
tests to corroborate the stylized fact of price flexibility during our period
of study (relative to patterns of flexibility observed in postwar data).
Contrary to conclusions of many models applied to postwar data, we find that
shocks to inflation rates produce positive and persistent effects on output.
Second, extending earlier examinations of credit rationing as an outcome under
imperfect information, we motivate this link by considering the impact of
deflation on credit availability. The addition of measures of credit
rationing accompanying deflation contributes substantially to our empirical
explanation of output fluctuations during the period.
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Much of modern macroeconomics grapples with the implications for
policy of how markets clear. Indeed, the adjustment of prices and
quantities lies at the heart of analyses of business cycles and the
effectiveness of stabilization policies.' Variations in cyclical
patterns provide a natural focus for economic analysis, because of their
importance for understanding how public policy and the organization of
markets ——forlabor, products, and credit —figurein explanations of
business cycles.2 In this paper, we examine the importance of price
flexibility and credit availability in explaining cyclical fluctuations.
In a textbook, "perfect—markets' model of aggregate price and
quantity adjustment, inertial price adjustment must lead to market
clearing through greater movements in output in response to demand
shocks. Institutional motivations for increasing wage and price
rigidity during this century have been discussed by Okun (1981), and
Sachs (1980) has provided empirical evidence of a trend toward sticky
wages and prices. Institutional changes notwithstanding, some
observations about the business cycle remain surprisingly robust over
time. Gordon (1980) and James (1985) find a consistent Phillips—curve
pattern of association between prices and output for the U.S. in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The robustness of the Phillips
curve to changes in the product aix, structure of markets, and degree of
price stickiness presents a puzzle for those who interpre-t the Phillips
curve as a measure of price rigidity.
The emphasis on price flexibility is particularly important for
analyzing these effects of the organization of markets on fluctuations
in economic activity. Recent theoretical and empirical work has focused—2--
primarily on models and institutions of the post World War II period.
Quantity fluctuations are amplified by price rigidity stemming from
institutional or contractual arrangements in labor and product
markets. Alternatively, confusion related to government policy
uncertainty produces departures from desired outcomes. Historical
episodes of pronounced business cycles in the U. S. and Europe challenge
our present formulation of the causes of fluctuations in output and
employment. Indeed, little attention has been directed toward
explaining the existence of business cycles in an environment where
prices are flexible and where policy uncertainty is not important.
Understanding cyclical fluctuations in a regime of flexible prices
may contribute substantially to our understanding of the modern
economy.3 It is often asserted, for example, thatgreater price
flexibility would reduce the economic costs of adverse aggregate demand
and supply shocks, or of disinflationary monetary policy. Any positive
link between price flexibility and output fluctuations raises questions
about the supposed stabilizing effect of wage and price flexibility.
Keynes (1936) himself discussed aspects of this channel, emphasizing the
likely increase in real interest rates accompanying wage deflation.
In particular, we argue that such flexibility can have adverse
•effects on macroeconomic performance through constraints on the
availability of- credit in the presence of nominal contracting in
financial markets. In section II, we examine links between price
flexibility and credit rationing within the imperfect—information models
suggested by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and others. Our principal
findings there are two —that(1) price flexibility makes worse the
potential rationing of credit to "information—intensive" borrowers noted—3—
by Stiglitz and Weiss, and (ii) the coexistence of Wairasian "full—
information" credit markets and "information—intensive" bank credit
markets complicates the definition of a sufficient statistic for credit
scarcity (i.e., "'the' interest rate" is not enough) and sharpens credit
rationing to information—intensive borrowers when the supply of funds to
that market is reduced.
We test these hypotheses and the potential real effects of bank
credit rationing in section III. Throughout the paper, we use vector
autoregressions (VARs) to focus on short—run dynamics of inflation,
output, and credit—market variables. We need, of course, a period in
which prices are flexible, and we constructed a monthly data base on
real and financial variables covering the period from 1879 to 1914 (see
the detailed description in the Appendix).4 The period from the late
nineteenth century to the creation of the Federal Reserve System
provides an excellent laboratory for testing alternative models of price
adjustment, financial—market equilibrium, and economic fluctuations.
Fluctuations in output were pronounced in the last half of the
nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, with
much greater variability of output than in the extensively studied
modern period (see Sachs, 1980; Gordon, 1980; DeLong and Summers, 1984;
Taylor, 1984; James, 1985).
We demonstrate that substantial price flexibility existed during
the period, to point out that models of economic fluctuations relying on
sticky prices are not appropriate for analyzing the period. Contrary to
the conclusions of many models applied to postwar data, we find that
shocks to inflation rates produce positive and persistent effects on
output. The finding of a negative effect of deflationary shocks on—4—
output, consistent with the recent results of Delong and Summers (1984),
suggests the importance of isolating structural channels.
We motivate this link by considering the impact of deflation on
credit availability. The special role of banks in financial
intermediation for information—intensive credit can create real effects
of bank credit rationing. We do not argue for a strict "banking panic"
view of credit rationing (see also the arguments of Cagan, 1965; DeLong
and Summers-, 1984; and Bordo, 1985);6 we explore local changes in credit
under a regime of flexible prices rather than extreme cases associated
only with systematic collapse. Specifically, we focus on the potential
real effects of deflation and credit rationing, given imperfect
information in credit markets.
We find strong support for the importance of credit rationing and
its links to deflation. Output fluctuations are predicted by a set of
credit—market indicators. Deflationary shocks in our VARs provide
additional evidence, with negative effects on loans and output, and a
positive effect on interest rates in "price—clearing" credit markets.
It is important to note that these arguments are made against a
background of a passive monetary policy. The active presence of a
lender of last resort might forestall much of the credit rationing and
illiquidity accompanying deflation in our model.7 We abstract from the
role of a central bank for two reasons. Conceptually, we ant to
illustrate the role of market failures in credit markets in explaining
the potential destabilizing effects of flexible prices. In addition, we
argue that these effects were present in the period prior to the
creation of the Federal Reserve System, the period we study here.—5-.
II.PRICEFLEXIBILITY,CREDIT MARKETS, AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Background
Previousdiscussions of links between banking system Instability
and output fluctuations during our period of study can be divided into
two principal camps with respect to their assumptions about price
flexibility. The first——the "monetarist" approach associated with
descriptions in Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Cagan (1965) —
considersThank panics" important because of their effect on the nominal
money stock and hence (if prices are sticky) on real activity. Friedman
and Schwartz, and Cagan focus on the decline in public confidence in the
banking system attendant to panics, which raised the currency—deposit
ratio8 and the reserve—deposit ratio, and precipitateda decrease in the
nominal money supply.
A second school of thought——identified with Fisher (1933), Minsky
(1975) and (1977), and Kindleberger (1978)——focuses on price flexibility
and "debt deflation" as a link between financial crises and economic
activity. Emphasis is placed on an irrational boom and bust cycle, in
which upswings encourage excessively sanguine views, "overindebtedness,"
illiquidity, and eventually banking crises, as deflationary pressures
from liquidation raise the real value of nominal debt commitments.
Reductions in the price level bring about increases in real interest
rates and decreases in net worth and profits. Recovery is brought about
when overindebtedness is eliminated or policy stimulus is applied. The
cycle then repeats itself.
Neither of these lines of inquiry provides a convincing explanation
of the relationships among contractual arrangements (in labor, product,
and credit markets), banking panics, and output fluctuations. For—6—
example, against the Fisher—Minsky school, Cagan (1965) finds that U.S.
panics did not in general foreshadow cyclical downturns; see also Bordo
(1985). Fisher and Minsky do not explain the persistence of
irrationality or the precise channels through which the degree of price
flexibility in the economy and the way in which banks adjust to shocks
are related. The monetarist approach depends on price rigidity to
transform nominal shocks into real effects. This liquidity—preference
transmission mechanism is, however, difficult to econcile with the
evidence for price flexibility in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries .
Asidefrom the problem of reconciling itself with the stylized fact
of price flexibility, the monetarist school has been challenged by Fama
(1980) and others who point out that, under the Modigliani—Miller
theorem, banks are powerless to fix even the nominal supply of money.
Of course, a world which includes financial intermediaries suggests de
facto the implausibility of the Modigliani—Miller theorem; still the
challenge to macroeconomic theory remains identifying which assumptions
necessary to the Modigliani—Miller theorem are violated in practice.
If, as many recent authors suggest (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981;
Bernanke, 1983), banks are information—intensive financial
intermediaries involved in costly monitoring in a world of asymmetric
information, then banks are more than passive mutual funds a la Fama.
It follows that their importance is related to the real costs of
intermediation and their role as least—cost suppliers of credit, rather
than their role as nominal money creators in a world of flexible
prices.10—7—
DeLong and Summers (1984) challenge the two schools of thought by
emphasizing a link between deflation and the real interest rate. That
is, to the extent that nominal interest rates are sticky, deflationary
shocks would raise real interest rates. If the interest rate examined
represents the full—information cost of capital, a decline in aggregate
demand should follow. While their argument focuses on the important
link between price flexibility and connections between financial—market
outcomes and real activity," three qualifications are in order. First,
while long—term rates did not respond significantly to inflationary
shocks (because of the price—level—reverting characteristic of the gold
standard), we present evidence that, ceteris paribus, the sort of short—
term rate examined by DeLong and Summers did exhibit a Fisher
effect.12 Second, interpretation of the real—interest—rate effect
described by DeLong and Summers is difficult in a world with capital—
market imperfections. As we wiLl. argue later, movements in commercial
paper rates may reflect, inter alia, credit rationing to the banking
sector, indicating that the DeLong—Summers reduced—form model may be
consistent with several competing hypotheses regarding links between
price shocks and economic activity. We present additional evidence in
section III to distinguish among these hypotheses. Finally, the notion
that sticky nominal interest rates caused changes in real rates seems
inconsistent with the historical gold—standard regime in which interest
rates across countries responded to one another's changes to preserve a
common risk—adjusted real rate (Calomiris and Hubbard, 1985).
Our approach follows Bernank&s (1983) attempt to provide an
analytical foundation for the debt—deflation view of financial crises by
focusingon the role of price flexibility in linking financial—8—
disturbancesand real activity, tinder fixed nominal contracting, price
flexibility with the possibility of deflation can exacerbate
fluctuations in real interest rates and aggregate demand and their
persistence.13 In addition, deflationary pressures can reduce aggregate
demand and supply through reductions in bank credit, the erosion of
borrowersT collateral and the failure of financial intermediaries as
fears of potential debtor insolvency rise. This view, however, does not
depend on "financial crises;" it can describe localized movements along
credit supply and demand schedules.
Deflation, Bank Credit,andEconomicActivity
To motivate our examination of the effects of price flexibility on
macroeconomic performance, we begin with the following simple stylized
macroeconomic model. Income and prices are expressed in logarithms.




82t + tyt' 8i' 82 > 0,
where p and I denote the (log of the) price level and the nominal cost
of funds under full information, respectively. Etp÷i denotes the
expectation at time t of the price level during period t + 1. The first
term represents the standard negative impact of higher real interest
rates, on aggregate demand (through, say, the interest sensitivity of
business investment and spending on consumer durables).
In the simplest possible model, no information problems exist, and
the competitive equilibrium in a Walrasian credit market involves
clearing through "price." Firms borrow to finance projects until the—9—
marginal return on new projects no longer exceeds the cost of borrowed
funds in the market. That is,
is— (Ep+i — isan accurate proxy
for the scarcity of credit. If, however, capital marketsoperate under
imperfect information, then banks and other intermediariesmay play a
special role; that is, they may enjoy an advantage relative to potential
or actual centralized securities markets in certain forms of
Intermediation due, for instance, to differences in information cost.
Thus, variables which proxy for rationing of real bank credit will be
marginally significant as indicators of capital scarcity when bank
credit is costly to "produce" and imperfectly substitutable with other
methods of intermediation. The presence of Pinthe aggregate—demand
equation is designed to capture this "special" role of bank credit.
The observation by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) that lenders ("banks")
cannot necessarily distinguish "good" borrowers from "bad" borrowers
implies that adverse selection will render unprofitable a price—only—
clearing credit—market equilibrium. That is, with a nonzero probability
of default, banks consider the potential for loan repayment as wellas
the interest rate charged when assessing the profitability of a loan.
Past some critical interest rate, banks will be selected against by
borrowers with a high probability of default; quantity rationing will be
part of a competitive equilibrium in the credit market.
This story Is complicated by the fact that many markets for credit
exist side by side, differing in quality of borrowers and the terms of
loans. These markets effectively sort borrowers along dimensions of
"Information intensity." Borrowers with significant financial resources
and reputations (e.g., the federal government and large, publicly traded
corporations) have access to "full—information" Wairasian credit markets,— 10—
(suchas those for commercial paper or for long—term bonds), while
information—intensive borrowers (e.g., small businesses and households)
require more monitoring and are typical of the transactors in the most
basic version of the Stiglitz—Weiss model.'4
Information—intensive and Walrasian markets exist side by side,
with borrowers of the highest quality able to participate in all
markets, and so on down to the restriction of borrowers in the lowest
class to the confines of the bank market. Borrowers allocate their
borrowings according to portfolio considerations, as do suppliers of
credit. In the price—clearing markets, we expect the interest rate to
decline with the risk class. There is no presumed risk relationship
between the bank interest rate and the rates charged in the Wairasian
markets.
Suppose for simplicity that one can divide the credit market into
three categories: (i) banks (servicing information—intensive
borrowers), (ii) a Wairasian market servicing risky full—information
borrowers (W1), and (iii) a Walrasian market servicing full—information
borrowers (W2). The sequential—market—clearing approach outlined above
implies that there is no single sufficient statistic to describe credit
conditions. To assess real effects of credit rationing, one must look
at changes in three components of the "state of the credit market": the
full—information risky rate i, the quantity of credit provided in the
information—intensive sector, and the spread between the risky and safe
Wairaslan rates (i —1w2)•This last consideration measures the
portfolio reallocation effect on the supply side of the credit market













































































































































































































Weillustrate our discussion of sequential market clearing in
Figure 1.For simplicity, we consider the case of two Wairasian
markets, for risky and riskless securities. The first panel represents
the market for information—intensive credit per the Stiglitz—Weiss
model. In that panel,P and Z represent the maximum return to banks
from making loans and the extent of credit rationing, respectively. i
and i represent the "Walrasian" and "rationed equilibrium" interest
rates. Interest rates in the full—information, Wairasian credit markets
are determined by the intersection of su-pply and demand schedules.
The mechanism linking price flexibility and credit rationing can be
formalized as follows. First, nominal project returns available for
debtservice will be riskier in a regime where there is uncertainty over
both prices and real project returns. Second, the value of collateral
will vary in a regime of flexible prices both because of variation in
theprice level and because of the likely correlation between project
returns and the value of collateral (particularly with "specific"
industry capital or farm land).
As in the Stiglitz—Weiss model, let the banks nominal gross return
p represent the minimumofthe sumofthe realized return R and the
collateral value V and the nominal payment contracted for. That is,
under nominal contracting, with a debt of B,
p =mm(R +V,(1 + i)B).
Of course, both R and V are random variables so that the expected return
EPisjust
EPmm (ER +EV,(1 +i)B).
Price flexibility increases the nominal riskiness of R and V (which
was a constant ex ante and ex post in the Stiglitz—Weiss model), so that— 13—
forany quoted interest rate i on loans, the likelihood of default is
higher than under the case of uncertainty only over real project
returns. That is, the p function in the lower—right—hand quadrant of
Figure 1 becomes more shallow, magnifying the credit rationing for
borrowers with access to only the information—intensive market in the
model outlined above. For such borrowers, more projects with positive
net expected value ex ante will not be undertaken. Credit rationing to
information—intensive borrowers is likely to be more significant in a
regime of flexible prices.
In addition, within a flexible—price regime, credit allocation will
be affected by deflationary shocks. The process of sequential market
clearing and credit rationing in response to deflationary shocks can be
described as follows. In the presence of nominal financial contracting
in the information—intensive ("banking") sector the financial system is
prone to instability. In particular, unanticipated deflation weakens
confidence in the viability of information—intensive loans, causing a
shift in the supply of funds from the banking sector. That is, the LS
schedule in Figure 1 shifts in, further restricting bank credit.
Supplies of funds to the Walrasian markets increase. The tightening of
bank credit causes those borrowers with comparatively large stocks of
information capital who need additional loans to move into the Wairasian
market (although at higher interest rates ex post). Bank loan rates may
or may not rise; increased quantity rationing allocates bank loans.
Interest rates in the risky full—information market rise because of the
spillover from the bank market. Rates on safe assets may even fall,
because of the influx of funds to that market.— 14—
Stateddifferently, a deflationary shock increases the debt burden
of borrowers and decreases their net worth. The resulting increased
probability of default leads to a rise in the reserve—to—loan ratio as
banks attempt to reduce the riskiness of their portfolios and brace
themselves for potential deposit liquidation. At the same time,
depositors react to increased risk by reducing their deposits. The
depletion of collateral increases the cost of monitoring loans or,
alternatively, reduces the availability of collateralized debt. If some
banks do fail, the idle information capital of failed intermediaries
will disrupt the flow of credit to certain borrowers. All of these
channels cause backward shifts of the real loan supply function. The
increased scarcity of bank credit may not lead to higher interest rates
if, as Sti.glitz and Weiss (1981) suggest, higher interest rates are
associated with greater risk taking; deflationary shocks which reduce
collateral may lower the upper bound on Interest rates and increase
excess loan demand.
These links among deflation, price flexibility, and the provision
of bank credit were not lost on contemporary chroniclers; indeed
illustrations of the transmission mechanism abound in the scholarly
literature.'5 Three economic themesemerge from the historical
discussion. First, there appears to be sequential market clearing, in
which credit markets close down, starting with those for lowest—quality
borrowers and moving to those for higher—quality borrowers. Second, the
use of short—term credit is one means of rationing available credit to
some high—quality borrowers. These phenomena are particularly visible
during the Panic of 1907 when credit became increasingly quantity—
rationed and short—term, as Exhibit 1 shows. Note that the market for— 15—
short—termbank loans was the only market cleared by interest rates
rather than quantity rationing in November of 1907. Perhaps most
important for our analysis, there appears to be a recognized linkage
between deflationary shocks and the rationing of credit —(I)from the
public to the banking system (through a decrease in deposits) and (ii)
from the banking system to the public (through a reduction in loans
relative to reserves, and quantity rationing to low—quality borrowers).
In the next section, we test for the real effects of this
rationing, examining links between price flexibility and economic
fluctuations and the importance of credit channels. We first present
evidence that prices wereindeed"flexible" during our period of
study. Estimates of time—series relationships among inflation,
financial variables, and real variables follow.
III •MEASURINGREAL EFFECTS OF PRICE FLEXIBILITY
?delingthe Relation BetweenOutputandPrice
Evidence for price flexibility and for persistent effects of
deflationaryshocks on output would fit well with neither the
Keynesian" nor "new classical" views on the origins of business
cycles. For example, implicit in the Keynesian model is the view that
shocks to money supply or demand, or to autonomous expenditure are
transmitted through changes in real balances or interest rates to cause
fluctuations in aggregate demand. Because aggregate output adjusts more
rapidly than price in that framework, changes in the movement of the
price level are revealed only after output movements. The price level
is assumed to respond to its own lagged values and the level of nominal
demand. Such a view could not explain a significant positive link from— 16—
pricesto output (e.e., deflationary shocks followed by a reduction in
output).
An alternative classical theory associated with Phelps (1970) and
Lucas (1973) suggests that if the economy were composed of a large
number of scattered markets and information flows among them were
costly, suppliers of goods would have difficulty distinguishing relative
price changes from general movements in the price level. The presence
of imperfect information leads to a positive association of price and
output. changes in the short run as suppliers misinterpret general price
level changes for relative price changes. For the nineteenth century
when transportation and communication were significantly more costly
than today, such a characterization of markets may be appropriate. In
its empirical formulation, the new classical approach holds that lagged
price changes should be useless as predictors of current deviations of
the price level from its expected level, and hence of current output
movements.
Evidence on Price Flexibility
Early evidence on price flexibility for many commodities during the
period is presented in Mills (1927).16 The lack of short—run price
predictability during this period has been demonstrated by Klein (1975),
who notes significant negative autocorrelation in rates of price
change. In Calomiris and Hubbard (1985), we show that prices were
linked to international markets even over reasonably short periods, and
commodity price arbitrage between the U.S. and England was quite
rapid. Below we present some of that evidence.— 17—
Measuringprice flexibility directly is problematic because
"flexibility" refers to the responsiveness of wages and prices rather
then simply to their volatility. In the traditional interpretation of
the Phillips curve, wage and price rigidity is the sine gnon of the
explanation of the relationship between prior deviations of output
growth from trend and subsequent departures from "core" inflation. The
Phillips curve relation is necessary but not sufficient evidence of wage
or price rigidity. It must also be shown that statistical information
flows from quantity deviations to price deviations rather than vice—
versa. We estimated traditional specifications of the Phillips curve
using monthly data and found contemporaneous correlation between output
and price deviations,'7 but the pattern of intertemporal priority
between output and prices was reversed from that of the post World War
II period.
To explore formally the role of price flexibility more carefully,
we estimate a reduced—form vector autoregression18 with eight (monthly)
lags of the commercial paper rate, the rate of change of the wholesale
price index, and the growth rate of output. For output we use pig Iron
production.'9 The well—known Persons (1931) index of industrial
production relies mainly on bank clearings and other variables of
questionable relevance for output. Another alternative, the level of
imports, is unattractive for our purposes because price effects on
imports are contaminated by the terms—of—trade effect. Our sample
period, 1879—1914, runs from the end of the "Greenback Ear" to the
origins of the Federal Reserve System. This is a peacetime period for
the U.S. during which counter—cyclical fiscal and monetary policy
intervention was negligible.— 18—
Inthis reduced form model, if the short—term nominal interest rate
contains ex ante inflation expectations, then a Lucas confusion effect
would imply significant marginal predictive power of output for
inflation in a VAR which includes inflation, output growth, and the
interest rate. Moreover, there should be no marginal information from
inflation for output growth changes. Alternatively, in a sticky price
model, aggregate shocks would influence quantities before prices, and
the predictions for the VAR are broadly the same as in the Lucas model.
The estimation and simulation results in Tables 1A and lB indicate
that inflation and interest rates are (1) statistically significant in
the determination of output, and (ii) important contributors to the
forecast variance of output. In addition, lagged coefficients on the
inflation variable are positive and statistically significant, so that
shocks to inflation exert a persistent effect on output. Current and
lagged output levels are neither significant nor important in predicting
inflation; note, for example, that while inflation accounts for 6
precent of the long—run forecast variance of output growth, output
growth accounts for only 1 percent of the forecast variance of
inflation. These findings are not consistent with either the confusion
or the sticky—price model.
Additional evidence for the flexibility of wages and prices is
provided by examining the intertemporal linkages between factory
employment and the real wage. Using quarterly data for 1889—1914 and
1953—1984 on factory employment, manufacturing wages, and wholesale
prices, we estimated reduced—form equations for inflation, employment,
and the real wage; data sources are given in the Appendix. The results
are presented in Table 2.— 19—
Thesignificance and importance of patterns of prediction among
these series differ substantially between the two samples. In the
recent period, all three variables contain significant and important
information for predicting prices, while in the historical sample prices
are, for all intents and purposes, unresponsive to past movements in
prices, employment, and real wages. Moreover, in the modern period,
employment is a far better predictor of real wages than in the
historical sample, while variation in real wages iSimportantand
significant for employment only in the historical sample.
Though not reported here, we also considered the importance of
price—clearing channels in international markets (specifically between
the United States and England) as evidence for price flexibility. In a
vector autoregression of interest—rate differentials for commercial
paper of similar maturity and quality in England and the U.S., gold
f lows into England, gold flows out of the U.S., the U.S. trade balance,
and the log of relative prices between the two countries, we find the
lagged quantity variables are not significant predictors of relative
prices. In addition, relative prices are both statistically significant
and economically important contributors to explaining movements in the
trade balance..
Evidenceon Credit Rationing
The evidence from Tables 1A and 13 indicates that the positive
association between output and price for the period 1879—1914 Is mainly
explained by shocks which originate in price. This result is supportive
of the debt—deflation view, and suggests extending the empirical model
to include variables more directly related to credit rationing.— 20—
Fromour discussion in section II, two transmissions of rationing
are important: (1) depositors' rationing to banks, and (ii) banks
rationing to borrowers. In the former, because information—intensive
bank loan portfolios are most Sensitive to fears about deflationary
shocks, the public's supply of funds to the banking sector will be
curtailed, reducing deposits, and forcing more conservative behavior by
banks. As depositors ration banks, even the full—information cost of
credit from banks goes up —asreflected in the "double—name, choice"
commercial paper rate.2° Commercial paper rates probably reflect the
full shadow price of funds to borrowers in that segment of the credit
market. If historical highs are indicators of the latitude for price
clearing In the high—grade commercial paper market, then the commercial
paper rate was well within the range of price—clearing levels during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2'
Second, as noted before, in a world with capital—market
imperfections, focusing on one interest rate is inappropriate. Banks
will charge even higher rates to less desirable borrowers, and employ
quantity rationing for least desirable borrowers. That is, borrowers of
differing "quality" will have differential access to credit, with credit
rationing of distressed firms and individual borrowers (see Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981; Friedman, 1981; and Bernanke, 1983). The two transmission
mechanisms we emphasize can be independent. For example, Bernanke
(1983) notes that banks held substantial excess reserves during the
depth of the Great Depression of the 1930s, indicating that the second
mechanism served as the binding constraint.
In our empirical work, we construct a set of instruments which
proxy for the credit scarcity effect (Y) .Theseinstruments21 —
approximatethe difference between the cost of capital under full
information and the actual cost of borrowed funds. In addition to the
commercial paper rate, our price indicator of credit scarcity due to
depositors' rationing of banks, we consider three types of measures:
(i) interest rate differentials on commercial papers of different
"quality," 22 (ii) indicators of quantity rationing in the banking
system, and (iii) proxies for the influence of nonfinancial business
failures. Detailed descriptions of the construction of the variables
are presented in the Appendix.
First, we include the differential between 60—90 day averages of
highs and lows for end—of--month "single—name, good" commercial paper of
4—6 months maturity (i') and "single name, prime" commercial paper of
4—6 months maturity (jCP) This spread reflects the interest premium
charged on paper of lower quality but with similar maturity.23
Inclusion of such interest differentials permits a test of effects of
credit availability on output.24 That is, if interest rate movements in
response to deflatio[iary shocks reflect only adjustment in the full—
information cost of capital, interest rate differentials (on securities
with similar maturities) should be unaffected. Responses of the
differentials to such shocks reflect credit rationing in securities of
low quality and the movements of borrowers with access to multiple
sources of credit.
That the various commercial paper rates may be imperfect indicators
of bank credit crunches implies that quantity flows may contribute
explanatory power at the margin above that contributed by the price of
funds. For this reason we include the real change in loans
(( Lt —Li)
I where L and P denote the stock of loans and the
price level, respectively).25— 22—
Finally,we also consider the monthly percentage change in the
liabilities of business failures (Lf) ; this variable is constructed
from the monthly series reported by Dun and Company. To the extent that
the rate of change of prices and proxies for credit channels are still
statistically significant and economically Important factors in
explaining output movements, the "credit—availability explanation" is
strengthened.26 Indeed, the use of Lfinthe models we estimate
uniformly improves the statistical significance and economic importance
of the effects of inflation on output.27
To test for the effects of price flexibility and credit
availability on output described above, we examine vector
autoregressions of inflation, output, and financial variables. While
such models are not structural, they are well suited for. examining the
dynamic properties of the interactions. Though not reported here, we
also estimated the regression models suggested by Bernanke (1983), and
obtained similar results —(i)that current and lagged "price
surprises" are important for explaining deviations of output from trend,
and (ii) that the addition of real changes in loans provides additional
explanatory power for output.
In Table 3 we present results illustrating the four credit measures
suggested in section II. The reduced—form model includes eight lags of
the following variables: the real flow of loans, the commercialpaper
rate, the interest differential between "single—name, good" and "single—
name, prime" commercial paper of 4—6 months maturity, the rate of change
of the wholesale price index, the growth rate of pig iron production,
and the percentage change in the liabilities of business failures.
Measures of statistical significance and of the importance of variables— 23—
inaccounting for long—run forecast variance are reported in Tables 3A
and 3B, respectively. The contemporaneous correlation matrix of
residuals is also presented in Table 3B. In estimations and
simulations, we find statistically significant and economically
important effects connecting credit proxies, inflation, and output.
As before, inflation is statistically exogenous to the other
variables, as Indicated by the results in Table 3A. Inflation predicts
output significantly, and accounts for 10.7 percent of the long—run (40
month) forecast variance of output growth in simulations. The
percentage contribution of inflation shocks to output growth forecast
variance reaches a peak of 14.3 percent at the three—month time
horizon. Inflation is also statistically significant in predicting the
interest differential. The near significance of the commercial paper
rate for predicting short—run Inflation is probably best explained by
the Fisher effect, while the small contribution of shocks to the
commercial paper rate to the forecast variance of inflation indicates
the "causes" of inflation are not channelled through interest rates.
Output growth is predicted by our credit—market indicators —the
commercial paper rate, the real flow of loans, and the percentage change
in liabilities of business failures —allof which turn out to be
Important in simulation. The percentage change in the liabilities of
business failures is predicted by the real change in loans, the
commercial paper rate, and the Interest differential. The lack of
significance and Importance of the interest—differential proxy is to be
expected since it is endogenous and not an independent source of credit
rationing.— 24—
Examiningthe contemporaneous correlation matrix of residuals
permits some identification of shocks. Whiletheseare results from
reduced—form models, the pronounced negative correlation (—0.41) between
interest—rate and loan shocks indicates the predominance of shocks to
the supply of bank credit over shocks to credit demand. That the debt—
deflation—cum—credit—rationing effect is important is also reflected in
the negative associations between shocks to output growth and the change
in liabilities of failures, between shocks to inflation and the change
in liabilities of failures, and between output growth and the comjnercial
paper rate; and in the positive association between output growth and
inflation.
Results from the impulse—response functions for the model reported
in Table 3 are broadly supportive of the dominance of credit supply
shocks. First, positive loan shocks exert persistent negative effects
on the commercial paper rate and positive effects on output. Shocks to
interest rates exert effects in the same direction for the liabilities
of business failures and in the opposite direction for output. Positive
shocks to the interest differential have a persistent negative effect on
loans. Perhaps most interesting, shocks to inflation provide an
impressive corroboration of the credit channel, with positive effects on
loans and output and a negative effect on the interest differential.
Our results presented here strongly suggest the importance of
deflationary shocks for financial markets and of constraints on the
availability of credit for real activity. That these effects are both
economically important and persistent emphasizes the Importance of
studying more carefully the dynamics of market clearing across various
credit markets in the presence of nominal financial contracting. Hence— 25—
thebanking panics occurring during our period of study may be best
studied as symptoms of the problems of providing credit in a world of
flexible prices. Our approach is relevant for localized changes in
aggregate supply and demand due to small changes in credit quality and
information, so that we avoid any dependence on "panic" explanations.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Modern theoretical and empirical research on U. S. business cycles
has in general relied on models with limited ability to explain cyclical
fluctuations when prices are flexible and little uncertainty exists
about government policy. In particular, the existence of pronounced
swings in economic activity during the period between the Civil War and
World War I, a period in which prices exhibit little rigidity, does not
fit well with these approaches.
In contrast to many recent conclusions about links between price
rigidity and the adjustment of output to demand and supply shocks, we
put forth an approach in which such flexibility can be destabilizing
through market failures in credit markets. We present a model of credit
markets in which "imperfect—information" markets of the sort put forth
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) coexist with "full—information" Walrasian
credit markets. The potential for deflation magnifies credit rationing
for information—intensive borrowers and projects, and deflationary
shocks precipitate a sequential market clearing among classes of lenders
in which the supply of credit to borrowers in information—intensive
markets is reduced.
In section III, we test for price flexibility and for aggregate
real effects of our credit—rationing channel. Three conclusions— 26—
underscorethe principal findings of the paper. First, we demonstrate
that prices were.lndeed flexible during our sample period relative to
their behavior in the post World War II period studied by modern
macroeconomists. Second, contrary to the predictions of current
theories about the sources of business ccles, we find that shocks to
the rate of change of prices produce positive and persistent effects on
output. Finally, we analyze ways in which deflationary pressures can
affect real activity through disruption of the information—intensive
financial intermediation involved in the provision of bank credit.
We are currently pursuing two extensions of this research. First,
the issue of why nominal financial contracts were used (given the
frequent realization of substantial losses ex post) is of particular
interest. Though it lies beyond the scope of this paper to show why
nominal debt contracts might be optimal ex ante, there are several
possible explanations. For example, fully contingent contracts may be
costly to monitor and enforce; indeed, as Bernanke (1983) points out,
the very existence of bankruptcy indicates the costliness of contingent
contracting. Whynominaldebt contracts are superior to indexed
contracts, however, remains to be demonstrated.28 Our approach to
-
analyzingcredit rationing lends itself well to extended analyses of
models in which short—term instruments along with quantity rationing
serve as equilibrating mechanisms when access to longer—term nominal
financial contracts is restricted.29
Second, although our emphasis is on a historical episode of price
flexibility, our results do not imply that credit rationing may not be
important for economic activity in a world with substantial price
rigidity. One sector of the modern economy for which our approach is— 27—
particularlyrelevant is the farm sector. Agricultural prices (and
hence farm land values, the principal asset of farmers) are relatively
flexible. If the sort of market failures discussed in this paper have
aggregate effects, a likely place for them to be observed is in a link
between farm bank failures and credit rationing and farm incomes. More
broadly, to the extent that banking—system difficulties and loan
restrictions have important real effects, important implications for
monetary and regulatory policy may follow.— 28—
Notes
1See the survey and review of alternative theoretical models in Gordon
(1981). As discussed in Zarnowitz (1985), the search for
"universal" models of business cycles which do not rely on
institutional factors has proven to be difficult.
2See the discussions by Burns (1960), Baily (1978), andDeLong and
Summers (1984) of the changing extent of cyclical variability in
the U.S. economy.
3Many recent contributions in macroeconomics (e.g., Fischer, 1977; and
Taylor, 1979) have emphasized the economic costs of wage and price
rigidity.
4Previous uses of annual data, ofcourse, make studies of cyclical
fluctuations difficult. The more frequently collected, data
reported by the Comptroller of the Currency (see for example
Gorton, 1984) are not evenly spaced.
5Romer (1985) has challenged the view that early businesscycles were so
volatile. Her reinterpretations of the data on employment, output,
and industrial production provided by Lebergott, Kuznets, and
Frickey, respectively, have in turn been challenged by Weir (1985)
and Lebergott (1985). None of Romer's suggested adjustments,.
however, would indicate that historical business cycles were less
or equally severe than those of the post World War II era.
6Historical accounts (e.g., the classic studies ofBagehot, 1873;
Sprague, 1910; and Mitchell, 1913) usually point to "financial
panics" before the creation of the Federal Reserve System, though
little effort is made to connect instability in financial markets
per se with macroeconomic variables.
70f course, as the l930s show well, nothing about theexistence of a
central bank per se guarnatees that these problems will be
mitigated.
8Gorton (1984) emphasized the predictability of bankpanics, as changes
in the perceived riskiness of bank deposits affects thecurrency—
deposit ratio.
9Contemporary accounts emphasized the credit (as opposed to the
liquidity preference) transmission mechanism. Brown (1910)
notes: "...it is not the saving of capital in the form of coinage
which brings after it a lower rate of interest. Rather is it, that
either is absolutely conditional on the other, that the lower
interest charge made possible by the banking function enables bank
credit, in open competition, to substitute itself for cash, or
induces among banks the policy of lending in general only their own
credit."(p. 748)
'0Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Deshmukh (1984) discuss the importance of bank
credit rationing for small businesses in the current environment.— 29—
11DeLongand Summers do note that increases in price flexibility magnify
the impact of deflationary shocks on output, though the result
comes from a model of gradual price adjustment based on labor
contracts, a model not as well suited for the nineteenth century as
for the post World War II period.
finding Is consistent with a model of financial contracting in
which short—term price variability exceeds long—term price
variability (as it would under a gold standard), leading to more
"indexed" rates in the short run.
13Discussion of a model emphasizing the problem of destabilizing
deflation accompanying price flexibility is also useful for
analyzing the behavior of aggregate demand during the Great
Depression of the 1930s. Researchers like Temin (1976), who blame
declining "animal spirits" lack a convincing motivation.
Furthermore, that real Interest rates rose In the face of a decline
in aggregate demand confounds explanation without analyzing the
contributions of deflation.
is, "informatIon capital" can also be considered a factor of
production, so that reductions In the availability of bank credit
will reflect real effects on aggregate supply as well as aggregate
demands. Hence Increases Inunambiguously reduce real output.
Blinder (1985) considers working capital in a similar context,
emphasizing the notion of a "credit multipller' (see also Bernanke,
1981): "Firms may have a desired or 'notional' supply based on
relative prices, expectations, and other variables. But they may
need credit to produce the goods. If the required credit is
unavailable, there may be a 'failure of effective supply' in which
firms fail to produce as much as they can sell?" (p. 2)
'5For example, Persons (1920) discusses the link between deflation and
credit market instability, and Brown (1910) identifies links from
deposits through bank credit to economic activity. Analyses in the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle are typified by the following:
"The effect of the unstable paper currency in checking the credit
system, and forcing cash transactions upon the business community,
is very apparent in the returns made by the number of failures, and
the amount of their liabilities, In the past few years."
(February, 1865, p. 113)
Furthermore, evidence of rationing of credit to worthy borrowers
appeared frequently in the writings of contemporaries. Stevens
(1894, p. 133) notes that many solvent businesses closed during the
panics of 1884 and 1893, and (p. 140) that wholesale business done
on a credit basis prior to the panics was done on a cash—only
basis. That the rationing longer—erm loans accompanying deflation
in commodity prices led to more extensive and expensive reliance on
hort—term paper is noted as far back as 1865 by the Commercial
Chronicle and Review of Hunt's Merchants' Magazine.
Sprague (1910)'s work reflects these same themes: "It would seem,
then, that business distress from lack of credit facilities was due
to at least three influences: The restriction of cash payments by
the banks increased the requirements of borrowers; the supply of— 30—
loanswas reduced by a moderate amount of contraction; and the
shifting of loans involved considerable uncertainty and
inconvenience." (pp. 302—303) Examples of the importance of
credit rationing and credit market segmentation appear frequently
in Sprague. "Their loans also must have been of high average
quality after four years of thoroughgoing liquidation and
recuperation in the business world." (p. 217, emphasis added)
"....it is certain that the demand for additional capital was
outstripping current savings seeking investment. Increasing
difficulty was experienced in marketing securities of the very
highest class. (p. 237, emphasis added)
"Whatever the causes, the inability to secure capital by the sale
of securities in a period of active business should have been
enough in itself to inspire unusual caution in the management of
banking institutions. When corporations of the highest standing
are obliged to resort to short—term notes it may be assumed without
question that other corporations are expanding upon an insufficient
foundation of working capital, that current obligations are
increasing, and that bank credits are being used to their utmost
extent." (p. 238)
"Borrowers are forced to resort almost entirely to their own
banks....Thisshifting of loans involves much strain and uncertainty
and in many instances it is not possible to carry it out at all."
(p. 302)
16Mills notes substantial differences in price flexibility across
individual commodities, presenting evidence for price flexibility
on average.
Prices of the large bulk of commodities at wholesale are
affected to some extent during general business revivals
and recessions...The number of commodities sharing in
business revivals has constituted, on the average, 79.7
percent of the commodities studied in specific cycles.
This proportion has fluctuated, from cycle to cycle
during the period since 1890, between 67 percent and 95
percent. The proportion affected by general price
recessions has averaged 77.7 percent, and has ranged in
different cycles, between 70 percent and 95 percent.
(pp. 434—435)
He also, however, describes an overall decline in the monthly
variability of wholesale commodity prices in the U.S. over the
1890—1913 period.
171n our estimates of the Phillips curve for 1879—1914 we employ monthly
and quarterly data on wholesale prices and pig iron output (see the
Data Appendix) to test for contemporaneous correlation between
devlationsfrom trend in prices, on the one hand, and those in
output on the other hand. We estimate equations with inflation as
the dependent variable and two lags of inflation, monthly dummies,
and deviations of output from trend as independent variables. In
monthly data, the coefficient on the output variable is 0.013 with
a coefficient standard error of 0.010 and a significance level of
0.19. This implies a .01 percent response in inflation to a 1
percent contemporaneous output deviation. The coefficients on— 31—
laggedinflation imply a long—run coefficient for output deviations
of 0.017. In quarterly data, the output coefficient is 0.047 with
a coefficient standard error of 0.020 and a significance level of
0.02. The long—run coefficient for output is 0.040.
'8For this and all subsequent VAR models,time, time squared, the tariff
on pig iron, and seasonal dummies are included as independent
variables in the estimation equations.
'9For a description of the cyclicalproperties of various output
measures over our period of study, see Eckler (1933). Following a
suggestion from Larry Neal we also used bank clearings outside New
York as a substitute output proxy. In the VARs, this substitution
did not change any of the results qualitatively.
20Conunercial paper rates,may, then, fully reflect the shadow price of
funds —thatis, if quantity rationing is absent in the commercial
paper market, and there are players, for whom the choice is
relevant, who elect to raise funds through commercial banks.
21Earlier in the nineteenthcentury commercial paper rates were
frequently much higher than any level reached subsequently. For
example, in October 1857, the commercial paper rate averaged 24
percent and in October 1873, it averaged 16.5 percent. In post—
1879 data, the monthly average is always below 11 percent.
22Descriptions of the various commercial paper securities can be found
in Myers (1931) and James (1978). Essentially, single—name paper
is the liability of an individual borrowing to secure working
capital. Double—name paper is usually the liability of both
parties involved in a commercial transaction for which trade credit
is needed.
also experimented with two other Interest—rate spreads —between
"single—name, good" and "double—name, choice" commercial paper of
4—6 months maturity and between bank time loans of 60—days maturity
and "double—name, choice" conimercial paper. As the results were
similar In character to those discussed in the text, we did not
report them here.
24We also experimented with the differential between the commercial
paper rate and the railroad bond yield as an indicator of the
shadow price of credit. While this is admittedly a rough measure
of loan scarcity, it captures a key feature of credit rationing due-
toasymmetric information. Riskiess (demandable) loans would not
be rationed as term loans would be during credit crunches; thus the
interest rate differential reflects, in part, the extent of
rationing in the term loan market. The results were not promining,
possibly because the interest rate differential may reflect
maturity differences unrelated to rationing (although long—term
rates are smooth throughout the period).— 32—
25Asa further indication of the cost of intermediation, the reserve—
loan ratio serves as a measure of credit rationing, of bankers'
desires to reduce the supply of credit given the reserves
available. The variable contains information on shocks to the
banking system; disintermediation will likely lead to an increase
in the reserve—loan ratio. In addition, the shortfall of bank
reserves relative to desired levels signals the potential for loan
contraction and liquidation. In our empirical work, we obtained
similar results using the aggregate bank reserve—loan ratio instead
of using the real flow of bank loans.
26Gorton (1984) finds the liabilities of faiied businesses to be a
significant factor in explaining the riskiness of bank deposits and
the banking system's currency—deposit ratio.
27For example, adding f to the model reported in Table 1, roughly
doubles the contribution of shocks to inflation to the explanation
of the long—run forecast variance of output.
28Reasons for nominal contracting in general include, inter alia.
transactions costs Involved with auction markets and risk aversion
on the part of one or both parties (see Canton, 1979; and Hubbard
and Weiner, 1984). In addition, institutional restrictions on
indexed contracts due to limited enforcement of negotiability under
common law may have been important (see Nussbautn, 1939).
29That nominal financial contractingmay lead to large losses ex post
calls into question why borrowers and lenders did not index debt
commitments ex ante. We are pursuing this issue as a topic for
future research, and offer a couple of preliminary thoughts
below. First, within the framework of the adverse selection model
of Stigiitz and Weiss (1981), an indexed loan contract will in
general lead to increased risk taking by risk—neutral borrowers.
This is true since in "good times" (high price level realization),
net cash flow after debt service is reduced, and in "bad times"
(low price level realization), net cash flow is relatively
increased. Such increased risk taking would lead to greater credit
rationing in the Stigiitz—Weiss model, so that both borrowers and
lenders might prefer nominal contracting. A second way to think
about the choice of nominal contracting (outside of a credit—
rationing model) is in the context of its insurance value in a
world in which lenders are risk—neutral and borrowers are risk—
averse. Consider two types of uncertainty —thatrelating to
costs of intermediation services provided by banks and that related
to the cash flows of borrowers' projects. Under plausible
assumptions, as long as intermediation cost uncertainty Is greater
than cash flow uncertainty, nominal financial contracting is
optimal.— 33—
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Economic Literature 23 (June 1985): 523—580.PRICE FLEXIBILITY, CREDITRATIONING,AND ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS:
EVIDENCEFROM THEU.S., 1879—1914
DATA APPENDIX
Inorder to capture short—run intertemporal linkages among credit,
deflation, and output, it is necesary to employ fairly high—frequency
data, but the shortage of comprehensive data on output and bank balance
sheets requires the use of rough proxies. For output we use pig iron
production; data are obtained from Historical Statistics of the United
States, 1789—1945. We construct a single index of wholesale prices by
splicing the Warren—Pearson index (for 1879—1890) and the Bureau of
Labor Statistics index (for 1890—1914). In Calomiris and Hubbard
(1985), we discuss results using more disaggregated data.
Our quarterly wage data over the 1879—1914 period are from those
collected for cotton textile workers by Layer (1955). Quarterly factory
employment data are drawn from Historical Statistics of the United
States, 1789—1945.
We construct monthly loans and reserves data from the weekly
reports of the Commercial and Fthanciai. Chronicle for banks in New York
City, Phithdelphia, and Boston. Though these series represent only part
of the banking system, they are the only available monthly data of their
kind of which we are aware.
The commercial paper rate series used in Tables 1A and lB is taken
from Macaulay (1938), and are monthly averages for 1879—1914. End—of—
month interest rates used in Tables 3A and 3B for 1894—1909 —on(1)
60—90 day average of high and low for double—name choice commerical
paper (analogous to Macaulay's measure), (ii) single—name, good
commercial paper of 4—6 months maturity, (iii) single—name primecommerical paper of 4—6 months maturity, and (iv) bank time loans of 60—
days maturity —arefrom Statistics for the United States, 1867—1909
published by the National Monetary Commission in 1910.
Dun's series on the liabilities of business failures is from
Base Book of Standard Statistical Bulletin, January 1932.TABLE lÀ
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VARESTIMATIONRESULTS: INTEREST RATES, INFLATION, ANDOUTPUTGROWTH
(MONTHLY, 1879:10—1914:12)













—0.10 0.08 1.00 y
Note:For definitions of the variables, see Table 1A.TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF WAGE AND PRICE FLEXIBILITY
(1889—1914 AND1953—1984PERIODS)
MODERN DATA (1953—1984) HISTORICAL DATA (1889—1914)
F—Tests: Significance Levels F—Tests: Significance Levels






P/P N W/P Lagged
P/P 0.036 0.691 0.024 0.417
•0.653 0.082
N 0.093 0.000 0.026 0.406 0.000. 0.336
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.611 .293 .927 .568 .091 .079
IC .115 .000 .095 .159 .102 .012
jcg—1q .888 .023 .000 .269 .838 .089
.939 .803 .017 .669 .033 .213
.840 .350 .494 .181 .000 .394
.742 .230 .074 .528 .078 .000
L =stockof loans outstanding in major Cities
IC =commercialpaper rate ("double—name, choice")
1cgcommercial paper rate ("single—name, good")
jCP=commercialpaper rate ("single—name, prime")
=rateof change in the wholesale price index
=rateof growth of pig iron productionTABLE 3B
VAR ESTIMATIONRESULTS: INTEREST RATES, INFLATION, OUTPUT GROWTH
BANKLOANS, INTEREST DIFFERENTIALS, AND LIABILITIESOF FAILURES
(MONTHLY,1894:10—1909:12)
Decompositionof Long—RunForecastVariance(40 months)
ContemporaneousL—L1 c cg cp 2.
Lagged P p
L-L
P_i 77.25 22.43 10.88 7.39 10.98 5.38
7.60 58.89 8.46 6.49 16.40 5.05
jcg_jcp 3.27 2.08 63.57 5.51 0.82 5.90
2.24 1.45 6.24 72.10 10.65 9.63 p
4.65 12.20 5.03 4.54 53.53 3.23 y
5.00 2.97 5.82 3.97 7.62 70.82







jcgjcp —0.07 0.16 1.00
—0.07 0.003 —0,12 1.00
0.17 —0.33 0.01 0.22 1.00















OF THE LIABILITES OF FAILED BUSINESSES















OF REAL LOANS TO AN INTEREST DIFFERENTIAL SHOCK













OFOUTPUT TO AN INFLATiONSHOCT
0.037EXHBT 1
Credit Rationing During the Panic of 1907
&3I3 Ito. 29.—LOAN AND DISCOUNT RATZS IN T NIEWYO1K MAB.KT,WEEY, 1890-4909--Continued.
Source: National Monetary Commission, Stat!stics of the
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